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VALIDITY AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONDITIONS
ATTACHED TO GRANTS AND DEVISES
OF ESTATES IN LAND
ERNEST

E. TuPES'

T

HE LAW of real property is recognized as being
one of the most conservative branches of the law
and the rules governing the creation of estates subject to
conditions have been subject to less change perhaps than
have most legal relationships originating in or antedating
the middle ages. Formerly common law conditions were
utilized to create relationships now more frequently accomplished by the use of trusts, powers, and even contracts. The restrictions upon the use and alienation of
land which are now enforcible in equity have also contributed to restrict the use of common law conditions to
a narrower field than formerly. The purpose of this
article is, therefore, not so much to discuss new and
modified rules of law governing the validity of conditions
as it is to bring together a number of decisions passing
on the validity of a variety of conditions, novel because
so infrequently attempted, and to reconcile those that
appear to be in conflict.
A considerable diversity of opinion exists as to the
character of conditions precedent or subsequent which
will be sustained as valid and enforcible when attached to
estates created by deed or by will. The authorities are,
1 Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law; member of Illinois
Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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however, in agreement that all such conditions are enforcible providing their performance is-not impossible, or
if not in furtherance of matters malum in se, malum prohibit m, or contrary to public policy.
An analysis of the conflicting cases indicates that whatever contrariety of opinion does exist arises from a diversity of viewpoint as to what conditions are contrary
to public policy. Since there is no standardized public
policy, it is not surprising to find a particular condition
held valid in one jurisdiction and considered invalid in
another. For example, a condition imposing a forfeiture
upon an estate if conveyed to a member of a designated
race has been held valid in certain states and the estate
forfeited upon such a conveyance, while in other states,
an identical condition has been held invalid and the grantee or devisee takes the estate free from the condition, the
criterion as to validity in both cases being public policy.
The cases involving forfeiture upon alienation have to
do with those conditions or limitations providing that.,
upon alienation, the estate shall come to an end or that a
gift over shall take effect. The operation of such provisions is to deprive the persons or their alienees. of their
estates.
The invalidity of conditions attached to a grant or devise of an estate in fee imposing absolute restraints upon
alienation has, in some of the early as well as in the modern cases, been determined on the grounds of repugnancy
independent of any violation of public policy. However,
a well known American authority2 on the law of real
property has made the statement, "In truth, the rule
seems not to call for any reason except public policy."
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court, in
construing an Illinois will, said, "IBut the right of alienation is inherent and an inseparable quality in an estate
in fee simple. In a devise of land in fee simple, therefore,
a condition against all alienation is void because re2 Gray, Restraint on Alienation, see. 21.
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pugnant to the estate devised." '3 Little reason exists,
however, for basing the decisions on repugnancy except
so far as repugnancy may suggest that gifts over upon
forfeiture for alienation are against a sound public policy
favoring freedom of alienation.
The modern limitations upon the right of a grantor or
testator to impose conditions restricting alienation of
vested estates appear to stand upon common law reasons.
The common law, since the Statute Quia Emptores
(1290), has held that a condition restricting all power of
alienation even for a single day is inconsistent with an
estate in fee, unreasonable and void. An accepted authority states that prior to the Statute Quia Emptores, the
feoffor or grantor was entitled to the escheat upon failure
of the heirs of the grantee, the escheat being treated as a
reversion. The grantor as a' result, did not part with
his entire estate, the interest remaining giving the grantor or his heirs the right to enter upon breach of the condition. Since the estate was not absolute and the grantor
or his heirs always had such a reversionary interest, it
followed that a condition imposing a restraint upon alienation of a fee subject to escheat in favor of the grantor,
was not considered repugnant or inconsistent with an
estate so granted, and the estate would be forfeited upon
breach of the condition. Whether the Statute Quia Emptores became effectual in Illinois or any other state of
the United States by express or implied adoption or as a
part of the common law need not now be inquired into,
for in this country no such right to escheat was ever
recognized in the grantor, but the escheat could only accrue to the state.
,.The question of the right of a grantor or testator to
impose such conditions in any of the United States stands
upon the common law as it has stood, since the Statute
Quia Emptores, in England, where conditions against
alienation attempted to be imposed upon fees are express8 Potter

v. Couch, 141 U. B. 315.

4 2 Co. Litt. 27.
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ly held void for repugnancy or as being contrary to public policy. This has been the rule except in a few English
cases and in one or two American decisions holding that
the suspension of all power of alienation of a vested
estate in fee for a reasonable time only is valid. This
exception to the doctrine has also been assumed by some
text writers and authorities and is supported by some
dicta in an occasional decision, all of which are referred
finally to Larges' Case, 5 an early English decision.
Larges' Case, however, does not in fact support the
doctrine that a condition is valid which imposes, on a
vested estate in fee a restraint upon alienation for a reasonable period. The occasional reliance upon Larges'
Case as authority for this limitation of the doctrine appears to have been based upon a literal reading of a
clause in that opinion, which, standing alone, might be
so interpreted. However, a careful reading of the context
of this decision indicates that the court did not intend to
announce any such doctrine for reasons fully and convincingly advanced by the Michigan Supreme Court in
Mandelbawm v. McDonnell! There a testator attempted
to impose a condition upon an absolute vested remainder
in fee, subject only to an intervening life estate, whereby
the devisees of the remainder were forbidden to sell their
interest during a named period. The condition was held
to be void. The court stated that the validity of a condition imposing such a restraint upon alienation is subject
to precisely the same rules as would govern the case of
a devise of an absolute fee.
In Illinois, a provision for forfeiture upon alienation of
a fee or of an absolute interest in personalty is void.
In this state it was decided that the primary rule of construction of wills, namely, giving effect to the intent of
the testator as ascertained from the entire will, yields
before this established rule of law and that a condition
5 2 Leo. 82.
6 29 Mich. 78.
7 Davis v. Hutchinson, 282 11.

523.
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in general restraint of the power of alienation when incorporated in a will otherwise conveying a fee simple,
is void as against public policy. In the case cited, the
will prohibited the devisee from selling or attempting to
sell, mortgaging or attempting to mortgage any portion
of the devised property and it was held that such a restraint upon alienation is to be uniformly rejected and
the devise sustained, because such a restraint is void as
against public policy.
The doctrine that conditions imposing absolute restraint upon alienation for all time are invalid has been
extended in many cases to include conditions imposing
such absolute restraint for a limited time only. The rule
as to invalidity of conditions imposing an absolute restraint upon alienation for a limited period was sustained
in another Illinois case wherein the court considered the
effect of two limitations in a deed conveying a fee, one
providing that the grantee should not, in his lifetime,
make any disposal of the fee and the other that the
grantee's interest should not become liable for his debts.
It was held that the grantee took the fee free from both
conditions. There are numerous cases, in other jurisdictions holding that an absolute restraint upon alienation
for a limited time is void when annexed to a grant in fee,
and that the grantee may convey a fee simple title.9
Some contrariety of opinion exists as- to the validity of
conditions imposing a partial restraint upon alienation by
forbidding alienation to certain persons or groups of persons. A provision for forfeiture, operative if the one
taking the fee alienated to any one except a person named
or a small class of persons, has been held void in England. 10 However, in at least two English cases such a
provision for forfeiture was sustained. 11
8 Hudson

v. Hudson, 287 fll. 286.

9 Combs v. Paul, 191 N. C. 789; Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273; Woodford
v. Glass, 168 Iowa 299.
10 Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. 330 (1835).
11 Doe v. Pearson, 6 East 173 (1805); In re Macleay, L. R. 20 Eq.
186 (1875).
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In a typical American case 2 the court in construing a
deed, containing a clause reserving the use of the land to
the grantors for life and prohibiting sale of the land by
the grantees to any one except the grantor's heirs, held
the condition to be an unreasonable restraint upon the
grantees' right of disposal and not binding upon them.
The question of the validity -of a condition in a deed
imposing partial restraint upon alienation of property
in fee simple was raised in a Maryland case. 13 The habendum clause of the deed contained the condition that the
grantee, his heirs and assigns, should not devise the property to anyone other than some person or persons of the
name of Brown, within the line of consanguinity or blood
relationship of the grantor, his heirs or assigns, with a
further provision that should the grantee, his heirs or
assigns undertake to convey or devise said property to
any person or persons other than those of the class
named, the grantor, his heirs or assigns shall have the
right to re-enter. The court quoted from Blackstone as
follows:
These express conditions, if they be impossible at the time of
their creation, or afterwards become impossible by act of God
or the act of the feoffor himself, or if they be contrary to law
or repugnant to the nature of the estate, are void. In any of
which cases, if they be conditions subsequent, that is, to be performed after the estate is vested, the estate shall become absolute
in the tenant .... For he hath by the grant the estate vested in
him, which shall not be defeated afterwards by a condition
either impossible, illegal, or repugnant.' 4
Following this doctrine, it was held that the condition
in the deed was void because repugnant to the fee conveyed and that the grantees took an absolute fee. Inas-:
much as the condition if held good would have limited the
ownership of the land to persons of the name of Brown
12 Chappel v. Chappel, 119 S. W. 218 (Ky. 1909).
18Brown v. Hobbs, 132 Md. 559.
142 BI. Com. 156.
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within the line of consanguinity or blood relationship, it
appears that such condition is contrary to public policy
permitting freedom of alienation.
In Illinois,15 our Supreme Court has gone so far in
the other direction as to hold void a gift over if any
devisee aliened to a named person or his wife. In this
case, the testator after making absolute gifts of his property both real and personal, by a later provision in the
will forbade any devisee or legatee from giving any portion of his share under the will to a certain person, under
penalty that if he did, then his entire estate should go to
the legal heirs of the others. The court, in passing on
this question, said, "A testator can bequeath and devise
his property by will or not as he sees fit. If he makes an
absolute gift of such property, he cannot by another
clause in his will restrict the free use or right to dispose
of such gifts."
It has generally been held that a provision for forfeiture upon alienation of a future interest is enforcible.
In Larges' Case, already cited, it was decided that since
a contingent remainder is inalienable, a provision that
the chance to have it vest be forfeited by attempted alienation while the interest remains future, cannot be void.
Some of the English decisions"6 appear to have decided
that where the remainder is vested in interest and indefeasible and the interest remains a future one, a
provision for forfeiture upon attempted alienation is
good. These decisions might have been based on the
rule in equity that an attempted alienation of a vested
and indefeasible remainder or reversion would be set
aside unless a proper consideration was paid and that
there was a public policy against allowing the unrestricted alienation of such interests. On this theory, it
would follow that provisions for forfeiture upon attempted alienation were not so far contrary to public
15 Jenne v. Jenne, 271 Ill. 526.
lin
re Porter, L. B. [1892] 3 Ch. 481; In re Goulder, L. R. [19051
2 Ch. 100.

. 160
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policy as to be void. However, the Michigan case previously referred to denied the validity of such a condition. The difference in opinion may be explained by
reason of the Michigan court placing emphasis on the
fact that a vested remainder is, alienable at law and
hence a provision for forfeiture on alienation is void.
A provision in the gift of a life estate or interest that
the estate or interest shall cease or go over to a third
person on alienation, either voluntary or involuntary,
is sustained both by principle and by the overwhelming
weight of authority. The language of an early Illinois
case1" indicates an assumption by the court that a provision in a gift of a life estate, for forfeiture upon
alienation is valid. The gift was of a legal life estate
or interest in personal property upon the condition that
the life tenant should have no power to sell or encumber the same, and that it should not be subject to sale
or legal process or for the life tenant's debts and if the
provision was violated, the subject matter of the gift
should pass to the next person in remainder. However,
the later Illinois cases uniformly hold that such provisions for forfeiture when attached to legal life estates
are invalid. 18
9 a legal life estate was
In Henderson v. Harness,"
created by will with the proviso that the life tenant
should not sell nor in any way encumber said realty during his lifetime. The will further provided that in case
the life tenant during his lifetime should sell or in any
way encumber the life estate, then such estate should
terminate and the remainderman could enter at once.
The life estate was sold on execution and the life tenant
later filed a bill to construe the will and have the sale
set aside. The decree was in his favor but was reversed
by the Supreme Court on the ground that the condition
was void for repugnancy. The court based its decision
upon the ground that there was no distinction to be
17 Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421.

Henderson v. Harness, 176 Ill. 302; Streit v. Fay, 230 Ill. 319.
19 176 Ili. 302.
1s
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taken between a proviso by way of forfeiture on alienation of a fee and one attached to a legal life estate.
In case of a fee, the court said the forfeiture is void for
repugnancy, and it is just as repugnant to the legal life
estate as to the fee simple since both estates are absolute and the only difference is in respect to their
termination. There appears to be no foundation for
this reason of repugnancy except so far as it suggests
that gifts over, upon forfeiture for alienation, are void
on grounds of public policy. If this reasoning of the
Illinois court as to conditions imposed upon life estates
should be followed through consistently, it would lead
to the conclusion that every right of entry attached to
a fee should be void for repugnancy and that every
gift over cutting short a fee, whether by deed or by
executory devise must be void on the same grounds.
The only sound reason for holding a forfeiture upon
alienation void in any case is because such forfeiture
violates public policy in favor of freedom of alienation
and not for any technical grounds of repugnancy. There
appears to be no reason of public policy or impropriety
forbidding the reversioner after a life estate from dictating who shall have possession nor does there appear
to be any contravention of public policy in protecting
the remainderman by restricting the ownership or possession of the life estate to the original life tenant.
The Illinois doctrine as stated in Henderson v. Harness
seems to stand alone as a decision contrary to the
general rule, but the dictum of the court apparently
limits the doctrine to legal life estates. The court
said: "The rule would be different where the legal title
to the property has been vested in a trustee for the use
of the beneficiary under specific conditions. That is
the most appropriate, if not the only way of accomplishing the protection of the subject of a devise." A later
Illinois decision ° quoted the doctrine of Henderson v.
Harness with approval.
20

Streit v. Pay, 230 Ill. 319.
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It appears doubtful how far a condition which is bad
on involuntary alienation may be good on voluntary
alienation. It was held however in Henderson v. Harness that a restriction against voluntary alienation is
not effective as to an involuntary transfer. The will
provided for the title to the land to vest at once in the
remainderman in case the life tenant as first taker permitted it to be sold for taxes or if he sold or encumbered it. The .court held that this provision did not
effect a restriction- against the life tenant's involuntary
alienation and stated as follows:
Except by the intervention of trustees an estate cannot be devised for the benefit of the legatee in such a manner that it cannot be seized for the debts of one having a life estate therein, as
our statute authorizes the sale of such estate under execution.
. The validity of conveyances or conditions in leases
against assignment or subletting except with the written
consent of the landlord; appears to be unquestioned and
recognized in Illinois and all other jurisdictions. It is
common practice to make the breach of such conditions a
ground for forfeiture and there appears to be no public
policy against such conditions, since it is considered to
be proper that .a ndlords should be able to protect themselves from the occupancy of the premises by others
than the lessee. The lessee's interest being an estate
for years, there would appear to be as much sound
reasoning in holding such a forfeiture void on technical
grounds of repugnancy as there is in the case of life
estates. Obviously, the Illinois doctrine, that conditions
imposing forfeitures are void when applied to life estates, is irreconcilable with the holding that such forfeitures are valid when imposed upon an estate for
years.
The validity of conditions imposing restrictions upon
alienation to members of a particular race has been upheld in a number of states on the ground that such
conditions are not contrary to public policy. In Cali-
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fornia2 1 it has been held that a provision in a deed that
the property shall not be sold, leased or rented to any
person other than of the Caucasian race is an illegal
restraint on alienation and that such a provision, limited
both to persons of a particular race and to a comparatively brief period of time, cannot be upheld on the
ground that the restraint is but partial, since there is
no distinction in California between partial and general
restraints upon alienation in view of section 711 of the
Civil Code of that state. While this decision is based
directly on the condition being malum prohibitum under
the California Code, it seems proper to assume that a
restriction against alienation to the members of any particular race is in violation of the public policy of that
jurisdiction for the reason that the code reflects the
public policy of that state.
A Missouri case 22 decided in 1918, pursuant to a different public policy, held that a condition in a deed
providing for forfeiture if the property is sold or leased
to negroes is good and that the forfeiture will be enforced, since the condition does not come within the
rule prohibiting restraints upon alienation. The court
stated:
There is-nothing against public policy in inserting a condition
in a deed that the property shall not be sold or leased to colored people. Such restrictions tend to promote peace and prevent violence and bloodshed and should be encouraged.This decision is in a jurisdiction where the courts
have sustained laws providing for separate schools for
negroes, and appears not to be antagonistic to the public
policy of that state or of other states having laws which
provided for separate coaches on railroad trains and in
street cars, as well as laws prohibiting negroes from.
attending theatres attended by white people.
21

Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 68Q.

22 Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573..
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A Louisiana case 23 is indicative of the public policy

of that state wherein the court, mindful of the Civil
Code giving the fullest liberty to contract and to dispose of property, held valid a condition in a deed imposing a forfeiture for alienation or lease to a negro.
It was further held that the condition did not violate
the fourteenth amendment to the United States, Consitution so far as prohibiting discrimination against the
negro race, since that amendment applies only to state
legislation and has no application to the contracts of
individuals.
There appears to be no Supreme Court decision in
Illionis raising the question of the validity of a condition in a deed or will imposing a forfeiture for sale
of land to a negro. However, the court has held that
the refusal of a cemetery corporation to sell burial lots
to colored persons is not a violation of the rights of
such persons under the State Constitution nor under the
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution,
which applies only to acts of the state.24 In view of
this decision, and of the general recognition of the validity of restrictions on sub-division property as well as
of agreements of property owners not to sell or rent
land to negroes, it seems probable that the validity of
such a condition in a deed or in a will may be sustained
and the provision as to forfeiture upheld when the
question comes squarely before the court.
The right of an individual property owner to attach
conditions limiting the use of the land conveyed by
deed or by will is universally recognized, and the validity of such conditions is determined by the same public
policy as conditions imposing restraints upon alienation.
It has been held in Illinois 25 that a condition in a
conveyance to a railroad company of a right of way,
23 Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724.

24 People v. Forest Home Cemetery Company, 258 Ill. 36.
25 Gray v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 189 Ill. 400.
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requiring the company to build a depot on the land and
to stop all accommodation trains -there, is not as a matter of law, illegal and void as opposed to public policy.
It was also held that compliance for a number of years
would not satisfy the condition but the condition would
continue as long as the railroad company used the right
of way and ran accommodation trains.
A condition attached to a grant of land to a railroad
company has been held void as contrary to public policy
in Illinois,2 6 where the condition provided for forfeiture
of the grant should the company build a station within
three miles of the land so granted. Since the directors
of the railroad company were held to be trustees both
for the public and for the stockholders of the railroad,
between whom there was no conffict of interest, and the
interest of both forbade that there should be a positive
prohibition against locating a station at any point on
the line of the railroad, the prohibition was held to be
in the nature of a condition subsequent, void as against
public policy, and the railroad company took the land
free from the condition.
The question of the validity of a condition in a deed
imposing a restraint upon use of property was again
raised in Illinois in a case 27 where the court had under
consideration a deed of one acre of land to -the Town
of Jefferson, the deed containing the express provision
that the grantee should use the land for town purposes
and upon ceasing so to use the premises, either in whole
or in part, the conveyance was to be void. The Town
of Jefferson subsequently became the Village of Jefferson and later the village was annexed to the City of
Chicago and the property was thereafter occupied by the
city. It was contended that performance of the condition subsequent was made impossible or unnecessary
by law and was, therefore, void. The court held that the
Town of Jefferson having thus permitted the exercise
26 St. Louis, Jacksonville & Chicago R. R. Co. v. Mathers, 71 Ill. 592.
27 Sherman v. Town of Jefferson, 274 Ill. 294.
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of its powers to pass to the City of Chicago, this
amounted to an abandonment by the Town of its entire
use of the property and that the violation of the condition, not being by act of law but by voluntary act of the
grantee, the grantor's heirs should recover the property
in an action of ejectment.
The rule that a condition subsequent attached to a
grant of land becomes void when it subsequently becomes impossible of performance by act of God or by
law so that the grantee thereafter holds the estate free
from the condition, has been followed by the Illinois
courts. A change in the law making it impossible for
a railroad company to perform such conditions was held
to excuse the railroad company from performance.28
Failure of performance did not divest its estate but on
the contrary, the estate became absolute upon performance becoming legally impossible.
There appears to be some difficulty in determining
just how far a condition in a deed or a will which
restricts the use of the property may go without being
considered as in contravention of public policy. It has
been held that a condition in a deed, made in good faith
and imposing restrictions upon use of land, will not be
held void as against public policy unless the benefit to
the public from so holding is certain and substantial.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in passing on a condition
in a deed which conveyed four lots and provided that
"no grain elevator should be built or grain handled
thereon," held the condition to- be valid and binding,
there being no showing -that the condition of the property or of the surrounding neighborhood had changed
in the meantime.2 9 The grain elevator, erected upon the
property in violation of the condition, was a public
warehouse, but in the absence of a showing that the
property was the only one available for a public warehouse, it was held that the restriction as to use was not
28 City of Chicago v. Chicago & Western Indiana R. R. Co., 105 Ill. 73.
29 Wakefield v. Van Tassell, 202 fl. 41.
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against public policy.
court said:

Referring to the condition, the

The condition as expressed in the deed is plain and unambiguous and needs not the aid of a court to construe its meaning.
Parties have a right to make deeds and insert therein such conditions as they see fit, and contracts entered into freely and voluntarily must be held sacred and be enforced by the courts.
As the parties make their deeds and contracts so the courts
must take them; and yet they must not be such contracts as are
in contravention of the paramount principle of public good.
So long as the beneficial enjoyment of an estate conveyed in
fee simple is not materially impaired by restrictions and conditions contained in a deed, such restrictions and conditions, as
to the mode of use, are held valid. The enforcement of these
conditions by the court arises from the principle of law that
every owner of the fee has the legal right to dispose of his estate either absolutely or conditionally, or to regulate the manner in which the estate shall be used and occupied, as the grantor
may deem best and proper. Just so long as the conditions and
restrictions are not violative of the public good or subversive of
the public interest they will be enforced.
It is not the intent of the parties alone which is to be
considered the true test, but in each particular case,
under the facts, the judicial inquiry is, "Will the enforcement of the condition be inimicable to the public
interest?"
Public policy appears to be violated by a condition
in a deed the observance of which results in restraint
of trade not limited as to time, space and extent. A condition in a deed providing that the premises conveyed
"should be used for saloon purposes at all future times
when same may be legally maintained" and that the
beer sold thereon shall be beer manufactured by a
named brewing company was held contrary to public
policy and void.30
A gift of property with a condition imposing forfei80 Ruhland v. King, 154 Wis. 545.
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ture if the donee marries at all is void as against public
policy and the donee takes the property free from the
condition. The American decisions have not followed
the law of England which seems to be in a state of confusion and conflict both as to realty and personalty."
It appears to be the general rule that conditions restraining marriage are to be considered as subsequent
and therefore void, but the English cases have not followed the rule strictly as to realty. Such conditions
were held void as to personalty in Morley v. Rennoldson8 2 and as to a mixed fund made up of the proceeds
of both realty and personalty in Bellairs v. Beltairs.38
However, when the language of the testator shows an
intention not to restrain marriage, but to furnish a
maintenance to the donee or legatee while single, the
English courts have held valid a provision confining
the devise or legacy to the period in which the donee
remains single, this rule holding regardless of whether
the gift is to a widow or to others. Jones v. Jones84
is among the English cases holding such a condition, in a devise of realty, valid for this reason. In
personalty, the same principle is followed although frequently based on the theory that a limitation so terminating an interest on marriage is good, while a condition is not.
An exception is generally made where the devise is
to the testator's widow; as to her such a provision for
forfeiture in most cases seems to be regarded as not
in terrorem but valid and enforcible, and the widow
loses the property in the event of her remarriage.
81 Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East 170 (1807); Jones v. Jones, 1 Q. B. Div. 279
(1876); Bellairs v. Bellairs, L. R. 18 Eq. 510 (1874); Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Hare 570 (1843); Barton v. Barton, 2 Vern. 308 (1694); Newton
v. Marsden, 2 J. & H. 356 (1862); Allen v. Jackson, 1 Ch. Div. 399
(1875); Thomas Jarman, A Treatise on Wills (4th Ed.), II, 50.
82 2 Hare 570.
33 L. R. 18 Eq. 510.
84 1 Q. B. Div. 279.
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Barton v. Barton3 is authority for the statement that
a condition attached to a legacy to a widow may sometimes be deemed in terrorem only and void and Newton
v. Mardsen0 is. authority for the statement that it makes
no difference whether the widow be the widow of the
testator or of some other person. Allen v. Jackson 7
applies the same rule to gifts to widowers by the statement that what is law for a widow is also law for a
widower.
In the United States, conditions which impose an
absolute restraint upon marriage are in general held
void except where they apply to gifts to the testator's
5 a typical case, states the
widow. Gard v. Mason,"
American doctrine as. it is applied to gifts to others than
widows, as follows:
Where a deed to land is clearly and unambiguously expressed,
and conveys it to another, but upon a condition subsequent in
general restraint of marriage, the condition, as a general rule,
will be disregarded; and a conveyance of the land to C with
full covenants of warranty, but if C should marry, the property
shall revert to the grantor, is construed to be in fee simple, the
condition annexed being in general restraint of marriage and
therefore void.3 9
The doctrine applies in America as in England that
the condition is valid if the will indicates that such
provisions are not in terrorem but are to be considered
as a provision for maintenance so long as the donee,
40
usually a widow, remains single. An Indiana case,
holds that it makes no difference whether the widow be
the widow of the testator or of some other person.
35 2 Vern. 308.

362 J. & H. 356.
37 1 Ch. Div. 399.
3s 169 N. C. 507.
39 See also Otis v. Prince, 76 Mass. 581; Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va.
509; Lowe v. Doremus, 84 N. J. 658; Robert T. Devlin, A Treatise on the
Law of Deeds, II, see. 965.
40 Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266.
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The Illinois Supreme Court,41 in discussing the policy
of the law in permitting a testator to impose reasonable restraints on the objects of his bounty, stated
that the testator "may not, with one single exception,
impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of his
bounty, by means of conditions subsequent or limitation."
That exception is in the case of a husband in
making bequests or legacies to his own wife. He may
rightfully impose the condition of forfeiture upon her
subsequent marriage. The reasons for this exception
being permitted are perhaps out of regard to the family
of the testator rather than to any morbid sensibility or
jealousy toward one who might come after him, which
might be supposed to have prompted the condition.
The same rule as to conditions imposing restraint upon marriage of a widow was later impliedly recognized
by the court4 2 in passing upon the nature of the estate
given to a widow. It was held that a devise of land in
fee simple to the testator's widow, followed by the
qualifications that if she remarries, she should have
only one-third, passed a base or determinable fee and
not merely a life estate. While the real question the
court was considering was whether the widow had only
a life estate, the validity of the condition against restraint of marriage was necessarily. recognized by deciding that she had a base or determinable fee.
The validity of conditions imposing only partial restraint upon marriage has been frequently before the
courts in England. The variety of possible partial restraints upon marriage that have been attempted has
resulted in no definite rule other than that a condition
which tends to encourage or promote celibacy for an
indefinite period is void. The English cases have recognized the validity of conditions subsequent imposing
partial restraint upon marriage, as for example, in
41

Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Il.

212.

42

Becker v. Becker, 206 Ill. 53.
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Perrin v. Lyon," wherein the condition was that the
donee should not marry a Scotchman; the imposing of a
forfeiture if the donee married contrary to the rules of
the Quakers ;44 not to marry a domestic servant ;45 and
marrying anyone but a Jew" are typical of conditions,
the validity of which has been sustained.
Although the restraint is in form partial, if it renders
marriage very difficult or practically impossible, then
the condition imposing it has been held invalid. In a
case containing a gift providing that the donee should
not marry any one who has not a freehold property of
five hundred pounds a year and wherein the grantee's
situation was such that an opportunity for. such a marriage was extremely remote, the donee took free from
the condition. 47 In several instances, it has been held
that if the condition subsequent against marriage becomes impossible, the4 estate then becomes indefeasible
on general principles. "
The few American decisions relating to such conditions appear to be based on the same principles as the
cited English cases. For example, in one case, a condition imposing a forfeiture for marriage to a named person was held valid and enforcible. 9
Shackelford v. Hal 5° states the Illinois doctrine as to
forfeiture upon violation of conditions imposing partial
restraint upon marriage. This case, by way of dictum
only, affirms the doctrine that a condition in partial
restraint of marriage, where the gift is of personalty
and there is no gift over, may. be entirely disregarded
439 East 170.
44 Haughton v. Haughton, 1 Moll. 611.
45 Jenner v. Turner, 16 Ch. Div. 188.
48 Hodgson v. Halford, 11 Ch. Div. 959.
47 Keily v. Monch, 3 Ridg. 205.
.48 Peyton v. Bury, 2 P. Wins. 626; Collett v. Collett, 35 Beav. 312;
Gray's Cases on Property, 1,'23-24.
49 Graydon v. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229.
50 19 Ill. 212.*
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as being in terrorem. The court held that a devise with
a condition annexed that the donee shall not marry till
he or she arrives at the age of 21 is lawful, and that a
violation of the condition, after notice thereof, will forfeit the estate devised. But the violation of such a condition will not work a forfeiture of the estate against
the devisee, if such devisee is also heir-at-law; unless
it plainly appears that the devisee had been expressly
notified of the condition upon which the devise depended.
One who has an estate or title real independently of the
will or instrument containing a condition of forfeiture,
shall not be presumed to have notice of the condition,
and shall not be held to have incurred the forfeiture
unless he committed the breach with knowledge of the
condition and its consequences. It was further stated
that the courts have very rarely held void such a condition against partial restraint of marriage even though
such condition may appear harsh, arbitrary and unreasonable, so long as it did not absolutely prohibit the
marriage of the party within the period wherein issue
of the marriage might be expected; so an absolute
prohibition of marriage until 21 years of age must be
adhered to as a good condition, a violation of which may
defeat a vested estate.
The will under construction in Shackelford v. Hall
provided a condition of forfeiture if any devisee of the
real estate married before reaching the age of 21. A
daughter of the testator, who was one of the devisees,
married under 21 in apparent ignorance of this provision in her father's will and the executor, who was an
older brother of this daughter, was the complainant
seeking to have the condition enforced against his sister,
as he would profit thereby. The court refused to enforce the forfeiture because the condition was attached
to a gift to all the heirs-at-law of the testator and it was
not proven that the complainant, who was executor and
therefore had knowledge of this provision of forfeiture
in the will, had given any notice thereof to his sister.
The court cited the rule followed by the English authori-
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ties as set forth by Jarman, 51 who states
that where the devisee, on whom a condition affecting real estate
is imposed, is also the heir-at-law of the testator, it is incumbent on any person who would take advantage of the condition,
to give him notice thereof; for as he has, independently of the
will, title by descent, it is not necessarily to be presumed, from
his entry on the land, that he is cognizant of the condition.
This case is interesting as illustrative of the length to
which courts will sometimes go in seeking to void the
result of a violation of a rule of law which if enforced
will work injustice and also further the fraudulent purposes of a complainant endeavoring to take advantage
thereof. The Justice who wrote this opinion, in later
commenting on the case, is reported to have stated that
the court was unanimously of the opinion that the
schemes of this unnatural brother should be frustrated
if possible, and it was only after several weeks search
of the authorities that this ancient doctrine was uncovered which was made the basis of the decision departing
from the general rule. The attitude of the court in endeavoring to avoid sustaining a forfeiture in this case
is more fully set forth in a treatise on the law of future
52
interests in Illinois.
Provisions for forfeiture upon breach of conditions
tending to encourage divorce are held void for the same
reasons of public policy as govern conditions in restraint of marriage. The rule is exemplified in an Illinois case 53 wherein the complainant filed a bill to have
set aside as void certain conditions in his father's will
including a condition whereby a life estate given to the
complainant was to be enlarged to a fee in case he
should become divorced from his wife. The court indicated that under ordinary circumstances such a provision would be treated as violative of public policy and
contrary to good morals as tending to encourage or pro51 Thomas Jarman, A Treatise on Wills (4th Ed.), II, 526.
52 Kales, Future Interests (2nd Ed.), pp. 869-870.
53 Bansdell v. Boston, 172 Ill. 439.
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mote divorce, but that this case should be an exception,
because plaintiff and his wife had been separated for a
long time prior to the date of the will. It has held that
since plaintiff and his wife had been living separated for
several years prior to the execution of the will and the
divorce. suit between them had been pending for more
than two years, and such divorce proceedings and living
apart were continued for many years after testator's
death, it could not be said that the condition tended to
encourage separation or promote divorce. The testator
did not disinherit his son upon condition that he should
live with his wife or should obtain a divorce from her.
He simply made one provision for his son in case they
were not divorced, and another if they were and the condition was therefore not contrary to public policy and
was valid.
The court quoted with approval the language-of Judge
Story 4 as follows:
So, also, conditions annexed to a gift, the tendency of which
is to induce a husband and wife to live separately or to be divorced, are, upon grounds of public policy and public morals,
held void.
This whole subject as to what conditions in restraint of marriage shall be regarded merely in terrorem and so void, and
what ones are valid, is certainly, both in England and in this
country, involved in great uncertainty and confusion.
The question as to what conditions affecting marriage are
valid must depend upon the circumstances of each particular
case, and will be very materially affected by the consideration
how far the condition was one fairly applicable to the relation
of the parties and the peculiar views and situation of the donor
and donee.
The court indicated that conditions tending to encourage divorce are subject to the same rules as conditions imposing restraint upon marriage and should be
54 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
I, 276, sees. 291a, 291e, 291d..
.

(12th Ed.),
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treated as conditions precedent, and on this point,
quoted with approval, a well known writer5 5 as follows:
-In devises and other gifts of real estate, courts of equity follow the rules of the common law concerning the operation .of
conditions generally, and their effects upon the vesting and di.
vesting of estates. In gifts of real estate, therefore, when a condition in restraint of marriage is precedent and is broken, it
prevents the estate from vesting at all, whether the restraint be
absolute or partial, and whether there be a gift over or not.
When the condition is subsequent and void, it is entirely mnoper-ative, and the donee retains the property unaffected by its
breach.
The court held the, condition to be precedent and void,
but. nevertheless operative to defeat the gift of the fee
to the son. In this connection, it is interesting to note
that While our courts have held conditions as precedent
and void, the effect of which is to encourage separation
of husband and wife, and operative regardless of their
validity or invalidity, the English courts have, in such
cases, recognized the civil law doctrine as stated by
Jarman" that when a condition precedent is impossible,
the gift upon such a condition takes effect in spite of
the non-fulfillment of the condition, except under certaincircumstances. J arman also states as one of the
exceptions to this rule, that the fulfillment of a condition
precedent which is illegal only because it is malum prohibitum, as distinguished from malum in se, will not prevent the future interest from taking effect. In several
English cases 57 where this exception has been discussed,
the courts have stated that a condition, illegal as tending to cause the separation of husband and wife, is
mere malum prohibit.um, and have endeavored to avoid
the exception by construing the condition as subsequent
rather than precedent.
55 John Norton Pomeroy,' A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, II, 439,
footnote 2, Gifts of Real or of Personal. Estate.
56 Thomas Jarman, A Treatise on Wills (4th Ed.), II, 524.
57Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden. 140; Wren v. Bradley, 2 De G. & Sm. 49;
In re Moore, 39 Ch. Div. 116.
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No authority is found in Illinois for making any distinction between conditions malum prohibitum and malunm in se. In Ransdell v. Boston,58 the court seems to
have ignored this distinction in construing the condition
as precedent and accordingly held that the gift to the
son to take effect upon getting a divorce could not be
enforced.
A later Illinois case59 furnishes another interesting
example of a condition held precedent and inoperative.
The testator having devised to his three children
"Eighty acres of land each, which I may select or elect
for each to have out of my land," failed in his lifetime
to select the eighty-acre tracts as provided in his will.
The court held that such failure did not operate as a
waiver or abandonment of such act as a condition precedent and that the devises having failed to take effect,
the land descended to his heirs as intestate property.
As has appeared in the preceding paragraphs, conditions precedent or subsequent are upheld or not according to whether they impose terms which courts favor or
disfavor. The excuse for disfavoring may be "repugnance" or I 'public policy."
To say that a condition is repugnant is to say that a
condition is not to be upheld because it is a condition.
The very purpose of a condition is to limit that to which
it is attached. It is inevitable that the scope of the donating words will be curtailed. The effect of making an absolute gift with a condition subsequent divesting the gift is exactly the same as a gift, not absolute in its face, but purporting to give an estate for a
time indefinitely limited, yet one will be good and the
other not. To call one condition bad for repugnance is
to call all conditions bad.
The right of a court to define public policy and apply
it according to the judge's conception of the best in8 172 In. 439.
59 Goff v. Pensenhafer, 190 IIl. 200.
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terests of the people is too long settled to criticize now.
The right of a court to nullify conditions on that ground,
therefore, cannot be denied, and any disapproval of the
decisions which we may entertain must be only because
we disagree as to what is or is not necessary for the
public welfare.6 0
60 In this paper, we have discussed only common law authorities, all
of which are in general accord as to the underlying principles controlling
the validity of conditions imposed by a grantor or a testator upon land.
No attempt has been made to follow through the statutes of the various states which, in some instances, have expressly modified the common law rules and in others, have been construed in a manner to modify the common law. It is, therefore, probable that, in a few jurisdictions from which cases have been selected as typical of the common
law rules governing forfeiture, later cases may be found at variance
therewith by reason of the statutory changes.

